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Pierre Moor 
LAW AS A SYSTEM OF NORMATIVE PRODUCTION 
– LAW AND SEMIOTICS – 
 
1. The law as objectivation of the form and substance of power 
There is in a certain way a vulgate of legal theory in which the legal system is defined 
as a set of norms. I say Vulgate: a theory circulating widely enough to be considered the 
official theory, which is composed in a fairly undifferentiated way of a few doctrines put 
together (mainly Kelsenian and post-Kelsenian normativism, realistic theories, and logical 
formalization approaches). 
Thus, the definition of the law immediately refers to that of the norms, as they are its 
constitutive components. According to the Vulgate, these are requirements, or behavioural 
models – accompanied, should they be breached, with the threat of sanctions. This 
definition raises a problem, which is primarily theoretical: what is the distinguishing 
criterion of the legal norm, given that there are other prescriptive systems? (I just said 
"theoretical", which is not, or not immediately pejorative: I'll wax theoretical myself, 
while nevertheless incorporating the practice of law into the theory by showing that work 
done on the norms is as important as the norms themselves.) 1 
The classic illustration of this distinguishing criterion issue is provided by the well-
known comparison of two situations: the first is that of a bandit extorting his victims their 
jewelry, the second that of a bailiff seizing goods from a recalcitrant debtor. Why should 
the order the second be “juridical” and not that of the first? Kelsen’s response is that the 
bailiff is empowered by a norm pertaining to positive law, itself based on the assumption 
of a logico-transcendental fundamental norm; Hart’s is that it is a legal issue in accordance 
with a positive law recognized as such by all authorities. These statements hardly give the 
question a satisfactory answer. Finally, a band of robbers – in more modern terms, 
organized crime – is also institutionalized as a hierarchy and its members are subject to 
rules whose violation is accompanied by threat of sanctions. Granted, the state has a 
monopoly over so-called legitimate constraint, or at least it claims it does, but in the final 
analysis, this power also rests on a mere fact of life, whose legitimacy has been the subject 
of endless philosophical debate. 
                                         
1 For more developments, see : Moor, P., Pour une théorie micropolitique du droit (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2005) ; 
Moor P., Dynamique du système juridique — Une théorie générale du droit (Genève/Bruxelles/Paris : Schulthess/Bruylant/L.G.D.J, 2010). 
 
What seems more crucial to make a difference pertains to the analysis of the modalities 
within which coercion action is exercised. In the context of a robbery, two purely 
subjective wills are at loggerheads, which have no other source but themselves and are not 
related – as wills – to anything other than themselves. The bailiff’s situation is another 
matter altogether: he does not exercise his own subjective will, nor does the judge whose 
court order he implements, and nor finally does the legislator whose decision is grounded 
upon the law. Each in their own ways, they all act in accordance with an order that is 
superior to all of them and over which they have no control (and it is superior to the 
debtor, as shall be seen in a moment): they cannot change it as they please, as their actions 
have got to comply with it. And such compliance is not only the one they owe to the rules 
governing their respective formal skills – their empowerment –, it is as much about 
integrating to substantive rules the content of the acts they decide to undertake. And the 
meaning of their compliance is altogether different from what compels a band of robbers 
to obedience: it aims to embody the objective rationality of authority acts, that is to say, a 
transfiguration of de facto power (always subjective) into the power of reason. Legal 
determination can exist only insofar as what the authority decides is integrated into a set of 
rules, which, since these are beyond the decision-maker’s control, warrant that his own 
will becomes irrelevant – insofar as possible. I call this transfiguration a “general 
rationality requirement”, and it is the complex institutional system that guarantees this 
requirement is met. That complex is the essence of law. We might as well say it straight 
away: the legal norm is not what defines the law; quite to the contrary, any prescription 
can only become legal to the sole extent that it belongs to the law, as a system that has 
been so organized. 
I should mention here it is true that, for Kelsen as well, the authority’s intention 
becomes objective will: but only insofar as it is – formally – authorized. However, I 
believe this is not good enough to characterize the law: it is also necessary that objectivity 
be ensured in its substance. 
One point needs developing at this juncture: it is not only the state power’s will that is 
objectified: the individual’s will also is, namely embodied in the legal person as subject of 
law. By integrating individuals via this figure, the law recognizes them as persons, that is 
to say, gets them to carry the burden of this general rationality requirement. The subject of 
law, thereby transfigured, is as much bound by the legal system as a whole (and therefore, 
but only therefore, by the norms herein) as the authority itself: it is bound to it, but also 
benefits from it in that, as a subject of law, he can enter into any legal relationship, 
whether as debtor or creditor, and is protected by it in these positions. Moreover, as such, 
he is entitled to that double compliance highlighted above – the formal and material 
integration to the legal order; we could even say this, perhaps: that, ultimately, is what 
properly defines him. That is why he is not only a “subject” ruled by a government, or 
even one “subjected to the administration”, or finally, a “person subject to the law” – since 
all these terms are passive! The rationality requirement thus includes the legal persons 
who are such – as much as are authorities on their part – only because they are made so by 
the legal system, because it institutionalizes the rationality requirement. That common 
reference to the legal order as a system, without which no government or legal subjects 
could exist, is what is totally foreign to the relationship between a band of robbers and 
their victims. 
 
The introduction, in the definition of law, of the rationality requirement has a number 
of theoretical implications. I mean, it must be said outright: this is a requirement, not a 
reality, in that nothing is ever granted. But I am merely pointing to an avenue of research 
that would lead to presenting checking institutions and correcting instruments (namely, for 
example, the good faith principle, or the concepts of gap). 
 
2. Legal epistemology as the core of the theory of law 
If the rationality requirement of law is the very essence of law, it means that any theory 
of law must include an argumentation approach: an analysis of the process the law 
undergoes before being formulated, a path through which any assertion can be said to be 
purely legal – that is to say integrated into the legal system. While this is also a 
jurisdiction issue, it is not only that. No legal expert will be satisfied with the competent 
judge’s assertion that virginity on the wedding night is (or is not) a bride’s essential 
quality (to take an example that has hit the press): the first and foremost focus is the 
argumentative chain by which the judge reached this conclusion. Evidence of it is that the 
judgment may be appealed, not because its quality as an individual norm issued by a 
competent judge could be challenged, but rather because the material implementation of 
this norm in the legal system is questionable. The purpose of the appeal is the 
appropriateness – the epistemic validity – of the argumentative chain in favour of which 
the lower court held that the norm is about to issue actually fits into the legal order. 
It is therefore the object of legal theory that is involved here: how to define law. Law 
may be considered as established through a collection of norms. But in doing so, it 
completely ignores what the law is in terms of work to be done: it is a theory of law that 
law experts in their daily activities, in their practice, are entirely absent from: law devoid 
of the practice of it. Now, they spend their time writing, reading, speaking, listening, in 
short, arguing. Arguing to put forward that the rationality requirement has indeed been 
met, because there is no norm– at least in the modern times legal system claim they are 
grounded on – that can dispense with showing its credentials – even the one enacted by the 
supreme court. 
This bears out that legal theory must begin with its epistemology: that is to say, by 
analyzing the mode of legal normative production, because it is precisely this mode of 
production that distinguishes it from other normative systems. I will do that here only in 
part, by focusing on the dynamics of institutional actors in the system. 
To take up again the example I have just given: under Article 180 al. 2 of the French 
Civil Code, “should there have been an error about the person, or concerning the person’s 
essential qualities, the other spouse may demand nullity of marriage”. The legal question 
asked in the instant case is whether the bride’s non-virginity is an essential quality, an 
issue whose solution will be given in the particular/individual norm ending the dispute. As 
for the legal problem, it is a matter of finding relevant arguments making it possible to 
move from the text of section 180 to the individual norm, a move that is no logical 
evidence, by far, witness two conflicting judgments on the same issue. 
 
However, though that shift is not logical evidence, how should is it to be conducted so 
that it can be described as legal, i.e. considered legally valid? Besides, what are its impacts 
on the legal system? 
 
3. Two modes of legal imperativeness 
In terms of theoretical analysis, the answer obviously depends on the initial choice of 
the problems approach assigned to the theory of law. 
Arguably, it is sufficient that the individual norm has been decided by the competent 
authority. This is the answer I mentioned above. The implications of this position are 
reflected in the concept of the sources of law: the law is what emerges at some point from 
an authorized source. What happens before it surges, as much as what happens afterwards, 
is concealed. Evidence of it is the wavering of the theory as to the characterization of 
jurisprudence as the source of law, and its refusal to regard the doctrine as such. 
However, despite what I called concealment, it is perfectly true that a norm adopted in 
accordance with the rules of jurisdiction is considered valid, at least until another authority 
competent to do so has decided otherwise. In terms of specific / individual norms, the res 
judicata principle applies. In terms of legislation, the problem is the institutionalization of 
the control of their constitutionality. Once the force of res judicata has been acquired, the 
norm becomes undeniable: it is imperative by itself. I call this mode of imperativeness an 
institutional one, since it depends on the institutional arrangement of jurisdictions. 
It should be noted that the force of the res judicata principle affects the pronouncement 
and it alone. The grounds themselves remain questionable. The cancelled wedding is 
cancelled once and for all, once the judgment becomes final, whatever opinion one may 
have of its motivation. Yet, if no appeal had been lodged against this judgment, nothing 
would have prevented specialists of marriage law to carry on discussing the grounds that 
founded it – hence turning it into a legal discussion, since it would have covered the 
definition of what is considered, within the meaning of Article 180 of the civil Code, as an 
“essential quality”. Similarly, indeed, the argument followed by the Appeals Judge may be 
challenged. What would have been involved in either one of these discussions, which I 
would dub doctrinal, is the material integration of the particular / individual norm in terms 
of the legal rationality requirement. The persuasiveness of this precedent would have been 
challenged in favour of another argumentative chain, which would have lead to a different 
norm. And the purpose of this discussion would have been what I call the epistemic 
imperativeness, i.e. the compliance, of a material nature, of the solution brought to the 
legal system. 
It is true that neither the doubts one may have afterwards on the merits of a final 
judgment, or even the certainty you might have afterwards of its lack of merit, does not 
result in any implication as to its institutional imperativeness (excluding exceptional 
grounds for review). That does not mean, however, they have no effect on the epistemic 
dynamics of the legal system. 
 
We will now focus on the very dynamics. 
 
4. Interpretation and application of the law: from the normative text to the 
general norm 
We distinguish between interpretation and application. Interpretation means 
determining the meaning of a text for its own sake, while remaining at the same level of 
abstraction: for example, if a text contains the words “the French”, are these to be 
interpreted in an epicene way, that is to say, including both sexes, or does it refer only to 
French males? As for the application, it is a matter of determining in the concrete case 
what is the particular (individual) norm that, with reference to the general rule applied, 
will solve the legal situation: for example, in such an accident, might any wrongdoing 
cause the author's responsibility to be involved? That question begs another: what are the 
duties of the author of the tort in the concrete circumstances in which he acted? 
All too often, legal methodology is confined to exploring methods for interpreting 
texts; it neglects law application – as indeed it neglects the problem of finding the facts 
(probably because legal theorists read supreme courts’ decisions, not the first instance or 
appeal judgements!). At best – as does Kelsen – it isolates the problems approach for 
exporting it, by attributing it to the so-called “judicial policy”; on one hand, such a 
strategy comes as no surprise since, for Kelsen, the validity of the individual norm does 
not depend on its material compliance with the superior norm. On the other hand, it is 
surprising, since, as I have already noted, a considerable part of legal experts’ daily work 
is dedicated to establishing the facts and enforcing the law. But the reason why we should 
pay attention to it goes beyond the realistic concern of taking into account the actual 
practice of the law. The legal authority – that is to say, the power of definitively 
addressing a situation – lies in its essence in conferring meaning to concrete facts by 
determining what the general norm states only as an abstraction, i.e. as indeterminacy: do 
such and such clues allow to conclude the facts that have been presented are true? (E.g., 
has the defendant had an intimate relationship with another person? Was the ground 
slippery?), and are these facts likely to be given the characterization ensuing from the 
general rule? (May the act be considered as a fault? Is this monument worthy to be placed 
under protection?). Indeed, the uncertainty inherent in any abstraction relative to the 
historical peculiarities of any individual situation (idiosyncrasies) must be resolved by a 
choice between all the solutions indeterminacy makes possible. It is in this opportunity for 
choice that legal authority lies (and its micro-political dimension) – a considerable power, 
since it means naming things: facts become, and in imperatively binding manner, 
something other than what they are in themselves; they enter another world, a symbolic 
one: “adultery”, “negligence”, “essential quality” – in it, they are transfigured, and 
compellingly indisputable. 
However, there is a profound difference between the logic of interpretation and of 
application (I leave aside the issue of finding facts). The first regards definition, logic that 
(in accordance with Umberto Eco) I call dictionary logic: it is a matter of replacing one or 
more terms with other terms that will be considered as their exact equivalent. This is what 
happens when the norm emerges as the “true” meaning of a text; actually, we only 
 
substitute another text to the original one; the text of the norm is redrafted (e.g. “French 
men and women” instead of “the French”). 
The application logic is that of the encyclopaedia. The particular/individual norm 
arising through application (or concretization) is a special case of the general norm– one 
among many others, hence not at all identifiable to the general norm. If I say, regarding a 
dispute to settle, that the pharmacist, who, by profession, knows the dangers of it, should 
take all necessary precautions for storing toxic drugs in a place inaccessible to children 
and that storing them on a shelf is not good enough, I develop a particular norm, which is 
one case of the notion of wrongdoing; yet, I might as well reach a particular norm that is 
the reverse, noting that, to access that shelf, he necessarily had to climb on a stool – this 
norm is also a case of the notion of wrongdoing ( non-cases are also “cases” of the norm). 
However, the cases of the notion of wrongdoing are endless, and occur in the most 
varied and most unexpected situations. To take another example, it is certain that, when it 
was adopted, in most constitutional laws, the guarantee of personal liberty did not know 
that cases could refer to the current legal issues related to data protection, artificial 
insemination, etc..., and we do not yet know what situations techno-scientific 
developments will create – and the judge will have to assess them in connection with this 
guarantee. Therefore, the specific norms constituting the encyclopaedia of indeterminate 
legal concepts such as “wrongful act”, “personal freedom”, etc., also are countless and 
unexpected; the encyclopaedia is permanently and essentially always open to being 
enriched with new cases. 
A major consequence results from it all. The general norm cannot simply be the 
meaning of the text that formulates it. It is also the encyclopaedia of the specific norms 
that were decided by reference to that text. In other words, the general rule known as 
Article 1382 of the French Civil Code or as § 823 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
is not only the “dictionnaristic” meaning of these texts, but also the whole encyclopaedia 
of all particular norms issued to solve concrete cases of civil liability – a whole set that is 
always open to future developments. 
This set is an organized and structured whole, worked out to become the system of the 
norm, with Article 1382 being the original text. It cannot be formulated in all its 
complexity; no textual formulation is able to account for all the internal differentiations 
brought into the norm by practice, i.e. into the richness and fertility of its encyclopaedia. 
Moreover, should this general norm be formulated – in a ruling, or by the doctrine –, as 
soon as it was being written, such formulation would immediately cease to be the norm 
itself, as it would in its turn become just one text among all possible ones. Any text 
formulates; therefore it merely fills the role of the norm; it is only that by which we can 
speak of the norm – it is even impossible to talk about it otherwise –, but it never will be, 
whatever its complexity, the norm itself. Besides, the original text has no other scope than 
to serve as the identical reference to all the discourses bearing on the norm – a reference 
that ensures that the former are about the same thing. Thus the general norm can perform 
itself throughout its history, whose episodes it keeps in mind to constantly organize and 
reorganize them. 
 
Therefore, any norm exists as a complex idea, which resides in the collective memory 
of the legal community, beyond all textuality, but can only be understood within the world 
of texts which speak of it as their reference. It is complex because it organizes the 
“tradition” – to borrow a term from hermeneutics. The tradition began with the adoption of 
the original text (often even before: Article 1382 of the Civil Code did not come out of the 
blue in 1804) and continued with case-law casuistry. It has been, and is, permanently 
developed and organized, reworked and reorganized, not only by case-law but by the 
doctrine, which reflects it, i.e. works on it, systematizing and sometimes even anticipating 
it. 
 
5. Argumentative paths 
Any lawyer knows that only rarely can a specific legal issue receive an immediate 
solution. In most cases, there are several possible argumentative paths, leading to different 
normative solutions. While clear texts do exist, they are most often clear only in one 
aspect. For example, maximum speed in urban areas is 50 km / h; but the rule applies 
generally, which means that, depending on specific situations, it might be less, since 
“speed must always be suited to circumstances” (according to a Swiss legal provision; its 
equivalents are bound to be found in other highway codes). Then again, clarity is only 
apparent: for example, if there is a provision that “inside railway station buildings, dogs 
must be leashed”, what about monkeys or snakes? The general norm will have to be 
formulated in a second text providing that “animals presenting a risk must be controlled 
adequately”. 
It is therefore necessary, since the text and the norm fail to achieve perfect clarity as 
formulated by interpretation, to argue until the validity of the normative solution is 
established. Arguing means showing that the solution about to be chosen is the one that 
fits into the legal system better than others, and the one the text itself would also have 
permitted. Normative indeterminacy exists from the start; therefore, it is necessary to make 
a choice by adopting a particular / individual norm – what I earlier called the “power of 
naming things”. The need to make a choice, which creates the micro-political dimension 
of law, constitutes the limit of the rationality requirement, because, as it can never be fully 
met, it always leaves some room for subjective determination – that which decides which 
the most relevant argument is. 
Two points are worth careful attention here, before a semiotic theory of interpretation 
and application is outlined, and before it is shown how it can account for the way 
information flows between society and the legal system. 
The first point concerns the relationship that allows giving meaning to the norm, either 
by interpreting or applying the text. Legal language is written in ordinary language, whose 
signs it uses: the signifiers of the former are made up with signs of the second (/dog/, 
which is the signifier in the normative text, is the word dog found in common language). 
Yet, if, in ordinary language, the relationship between the signifier /dog/ and the signified, 
“dog” is arbitrary (there is no reason to attribute to the signified that particular signifier 
rather than another), the same can’t be said of the legal language: in other words, the 
 
relationship between the legal signifier and its signified is not arbitrary, it is motivated. 
However, as part of the legal code (not of the linguistic code), it can be de-motivated, that 
is to say, distanced from its meaning in ordinary language (“dog”), precisely according to 
its code. The interpretation and application can therefore use all polysemous possibilities  
and ambiguities of ordinary language, which form the semantic framework (all 
encyclopaedic potential meanings) within which the reading of the text evolves; it can 
even use figures of speech – e.g. metonymy, in the case of the legal signifier /dog/. 
However, de-motivation from the linguistic code and ordinary meaning of its signs 
requires re-motivation explaining the reasons (rationality) of this distortion of meaning. It 
is at this point that classical interpretation methods take place, with a heuristic function (as 
in the example of /dog/, the purposive (teleological) approach); they are used to suggest 
directions for other possible meanings, but they obviously do not directly provide the 
reasons, motives, rationality of such diversion. This is why, incidentally, there exists no 
methodology for methods of interpretation. This could be summarized as follows: any 
reader – as a matter of law – must be able to understand the normative text using the 
vocabulary and syntax of ordinary language, including the surprises embodied by 
diversions of meaning. 
These reasons, contrary to what one might think, do not only have endogenous origins. 
Indeed, the legal argument not only contains reasons already known to be legal (internal 
argumentative schemes), but also the arguments it takes from its socio-cultural 
environment – arguments that, by taking them up again, gets them to become legal 
(external schemes). We are now addressing the second point here. 
First, let us take an example. For a long time, on the basis of a text dating back to the 
19th century, Swiss private international law used to recognize the divorce of foreign 
spouses living in Switzerland, provided their State of origin recognized that divorce; for 
spouses of different nationalities, the text was interpreted as requiring recognition by both 
states of origin. In 1968, at a time when Italy did not recognize divorce, the Federal Court 
proceeded to a reversal of precedent and admitted that only the law effective in the State of 
the requesting spouse was critical; the plaintiff was a French woman and the defendant 
was Italian (significantly, the Court, composed of five judges, ruled by a majority of three 
against two). Here is an excerpt of the reasons: “If the judge cannot base his judgements 
on considerations of desirable law, he must nevertheless strive [to interpret] the law in a 
manner as consistent as possible with the situation and the current mentality. To this end, 
he will often be led to abandon a traditional interpretation, which was probably justified 
when the law was drafted, but that is no longer sustainable because of changing 
circumstances or even due to the way ideas have evolved. [ ... ] The cumulative 
application of each spouse’s national laws is indefensible if the principle is openly laid 
down that divorce should remain an exceptional mode of marriage dissolution. Such a 
statement is inconsistent with reality, both in Switzerland and in most neighbouring 
countries.” 
What we see in this judgment, is the intervention in the argumentative path – assuming 
that the original text of the norm is drafted so as to allow both interpretations – of reasons 
relating to “change in circumstances” and the “evolution of ideas”, in short, to “reality.” 
So these are facts, not legal ones, which are considered critical: since the adoption of the 
 
text, divorce has become common practice, an institution socially recognized for being 
ordinary, that has somehow fully become an everyday feature of life; therefore an 
interpretation restricting the possibility of divorce must be rejected, and the norm 
reformulated otherwise than previously. We see here that the assessment of a social fact – 
a culture, social knowledge – is taken up again by the court and, as such, will enter the 
legal order as a legal rationality reason. 
The same goes for the case of the pharmacist, mentioned above, who stored a drug in a 
place where, by climbing on a stool, a child was able to grab and gulp it down it as if it 
were candy. The judge will have to decide between pharmacists’ ethical duties (was the 
precaution he took good enough?). What about the duty of parental supervision (should 
they have watched their offspring’s behaviour more carefully?). To do so, the law, in the 
current state of its encyclopaedia, might prove of no avail (if we hypothetically assume 
that there is no case-law and no specific legal provisions on one point or another): he will 
then have to resort to such patterns of behaviour that are considered as received in the 
customs, habits and manners of the society in which he lives and that, finally, the 
particular norm he will select is designed for – which presupposes it will have to be such 
as being socially acceptable. 
There is therefore a constant information exchange between the law and society: on 
one hand, from the former to the latter, by providing knowledge, models, etc., and on the 
other, the latter reinstates the former in normative form. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Three conclusions actually, to gather all of the above, which may appear 
heterogeneous. 
Firstly, institutional imperativeness – that of res judicata – is only one part of the legal 
order. What constitutes, organizes and systematizes it, allowing its coherence and 
development, thus ensuring the general rationality requirement, is working on epistemic 
imperativeness. 
Second: norms are the result of production work. This work is accomplished through 
texts – the original text, the texts of the specific norms, those of the doctrinal 
systematizations. It is communication work: in other words, a constant exchange of 
discourses. All these discourses always give themselves the same reference, namely the 
original text, which ensures the unity of their object (which is the norm, their common 
referent, as we would say in semiotics); but this object is permanently found and 
recovered in enriching the encyclopaedia of knowledge that is being developed on this 
topic. A more rational encyclopaedia, as consistent as possible, so that it can project itself 
into the future, when it will have to include new specific norms, as they will be required to 
accommodate all of the unexpected situations that are sure to arise in future. 
Thirdly: norms result from the work of all legal institutions. Not only the legislator but 
also the judges – past, present and future – as well as doctrine. The law is not only a static 
 
reserve of texts (or of norms), but also a set of institutions that produce norms by working 
on texts. A set of people – the legal community – in whose operations not only memory, 
but also its actors’ imagination, guaranteed by judicial independence and freedom of 
expression, play a crucial role. Or, more precisely than a whole set, it is a system; by that I 
mean an organization that has three characteristics. Firstly, its identity lies in the way its 
elements relate to each other and at the same time – in second place – it, within itself, 
confers to each of them their own identity, by differentiating their functions; thirdly, this 
differentiation enables the system to maintain its own relations with its socio-political 
environment. And, speaking of the environment, we must specifically include, among the 
actors of the legal system, an essential category we sometimes tend to forget: the subjects 
of law, who, as such, are inside the system, but who, as individuals, remain outside – it is, 
factually, this dual nature as both a legal concept and a social reality that opens a channel 
of communication between the legal system and its environment. Indeed, the practices, 
knowledge, ideologies that prevail in society make up a secular legal culture, in a 
somehow inchoate way, awaiting consecration; a culture whose priestly caste – legal 
experts – keep fuelling its argumentative paths during the normative invention process. A 
dual nature, moreover, that also affects the judge’s position, as he is both and at the same 
time a function as well as (he, too) an individual. 
Conclusion of conclusions: a definition of the norm can hardly be given, let alone 
defining the law, without betraying the richness of its organization and the limits that the 
latter provides to what the law, as a social subsystem, is capable of producing in terms of 
rationality. This is impossible because, to account for it, one should be able to summarize 
in one single formula the complexity of the system it constitutes: we should be able to 
understand it in its entirety in one swoop. For example, what I said about the norm 
distinguishing criterion as postulating a rationality requirement cannot be fully understood 
unless we understand the normative production process. But, conversely, this process can 
only be understood if we understand that the law assumes a rationality requirement. There 
is circularity in the structure of the whole, which makes it impossible to isolate any one of 
its elements to define it by itself, and which to the same extent prevents the whole from 
being defined without taking its elements organization into account. 
 
